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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The federal courts do not exist for the purpose of clearing their 
dockets. They exist to unify the federal system, to interpret and enforce 
federal law, and to prevent interstate prejudices and allegiances from 
balkanizing the nation.”1 – Professor Martin H. Redish 
 
First principles of our Republic teach that federal courts are courts 
of limited jurisdiction, the boundaries of which are designated by the 
Constitution of the United States. Article III provides that “[t]he 
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties.”2 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Vanderbilt University, B.S. magna cum laude, May 2001. William K. 
Hadler would like to thank his family, namely his wife, Megan, and his parents, 
Richard and Jane Hadler, for their love and support. 
1 Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between 
State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles”, 78 
VA. L. REV. 1769, 1786 (1992). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1. 
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While this precise language was codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331,3 “it is 
uncontroversial that the federal question statutory jurisdictional grant 
is narrower than its identically worded constitutional counterpart, [but] 
its precise scope is unclear with respect to state law claims that 
implicate questions of federal law.”4 These so-called “hybrid claims” 
usually occur when a plaintiff brings a cause of action in state court, 
but uses the violation of a federal statute to satisfy an element of the 
state law claim.5 These cases “force district courts to confront a 
confusing line of cases in which the Supreme Court’s attempts to 
articulate an all-purpose, bright line test for the § 1331 inquiry have 
consistently failed.”6 In the field of subject matter jurisdiction, the 
“question that has caused the most analytical difficulty for the 
allocation of jurisdiction over the past century is whether a federal 
court has original federal question jurisdiction when an issue of federal 
law is embedded in a claim created by state law.”7  
The most recent Supreme Court case to address this issue was 
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & 
Manufacturing.8 In this case, the Court established a new test to 
govern these hybrid cases and to assess the grant of federal question 
jurisdiction. The Court announced that the federal courthouse doors 
are open for a suit that “necessarily raise[d] a stated federal issue, 
                                                 
3 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.”). 
4 Harvard Law Review Association, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal 
Question Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
2272, 2273 (2002) [hereinafter Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court].  
5 Although at least one commentator has questioned the use of the terminology 
“hybrid” or “mixed” claims to describe these cases and argues that the term 
“embedded” is more appropriate, all of these terms are presented in this Note 
interchangeably to describe a case in which federal issues appear in state law claims. 
See Douglas D. McFarland, The True Compass: No Federal Question in a State Law 
Claim, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006). 
6 Adam P.M. Tarleton, In Search of the Welcome Mat: The Scope of Statutory 
Federal Question Jurisdiction After Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue 
Engineering & Manufacturing, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1394, 1413 (2006).  
7 McFarland, supra note 5, at 1.  
8 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). 
2
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actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain 
without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal 
and state judicial responsibilities.”9   
Following Grable, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on 
its own hybrid case, Bennett v. Southwest Airlines Co.10 In Bennett, the 
plaintiffs,11 who were injured as a result of a Southwest Airlines crash 
at Midway Airport in Chicago on December 8, 2005, filed tort suits in 
Illinois state court.12 The defendants (Southwest Airlines Co., The 
Boeing Company, and the City of Chicago) removed these 
consolidated suits to federal court.13 The United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois “denied the motion to remand [to 
state court], but certified the decision for interlocutory appeal,” which 
the Seventh Circuit accepted.14 On appeal, the defendants’ argued that 
the state claims rested on federal aviation regulations that required 
uniform interpretation and application by a federal forum.15 On the 
other hand, the plaintiffs argued that the claims in this case represented 
“garden variety state-law tort claims.”16 The Seventh Circuit reversed 
the district court’s decision and remanded the case to state court.17 
While the Seventh Circuit made the correct decision in Bennett, 
the test it used to reject federal question jurisdiction was flawed. This 
Note discusses and examines the evolution of the tests used to analyze 
jurisdiction in these hybrid cases. It divides these tests into two 
categories: the Traditional Test, based on a reconciliation of the issue 
in the case with the original purposes of the lower federal courts; and 
                                                 
9 Id. at 314. 
10 484 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2007). 
11 Brief of Defendant-Appellee the Boeing Company at 5, Bennett, 484 F.3d 
907 (No. 06-3486), 2007 WL 414512 at *4-5 (7th Cir. Jan. 24, 2007) (“Plaintiffs in 
these consolidated cases are various passengers, bystanders, and the estate and 
family members of the child who was killed.”). 
12 Bennett, 484 F.3d at 908. 
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 909. 
16 Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 5, Bennett, 484 F.3d 907 (No. 06-
3486), 2006 WL 3368827, at *5 (7th Cir. 2006). 
17 Bennett, 484 F.3d at 912. 
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the Modern Test, based on using the effect on the federal docket as a 
factor in decisions granting federal question jurisdiction. Part I of this 
Note identifies and explains the traditional Supreme Court test used to 
decide federal jurisdiction when federal issues presented themselves in 
state law claims. Part II illustrates the Supreme Court’s departure from 
this traditional method. It shows how the Court moved to a Modern 
Test that takes into account federal caseload issues in Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson18 and Grable.19 Part III discusses 
the Bennett decision, and examines the application of the Modern Test 
in the Seventh Circuit. Part IV discusses the problems with 
considering caseload factors in the adjudication of federal question 
jurisdiction and proposes an alternative analysis the Seventh Circuit 
could have used that would have reached the same result.  
 
I. THE TRADITIONAL TEST FOR FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION IN 
STATE LAW CLAIMS 
 
This section identifies the differences between the traditional and 
Modern Tests for federal question jurisdiction in hybrid claims. Then it 
examines the origins and development of the Traditional Test to 
provide context for the evaluation of the Modern Test, as applied by 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Bennett.  
 
A. The Traditional and the Modern Tests 
 
In Bennett, the defendants removed the case to the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois after the plaintiffs 
originally filed a complaint in Illinois state court.20 The federal 
removal statute permits civil actions “arising under” federal law to be 
removed from state court to federal court.21 Traditionally, a court 
evaluates the removability of actions based on the well-pleaded 
                                                 
18 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
19 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 
(2005). 
20 Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 908 (7th Cir. 2007). 
21 28 U.S.C. §1441(b) (2000). 
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complaint rule established in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. 
Erasmus L. Mottley.22 Under this rule, “a suit arises under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States only when plaintiff’s 
statement of his own cause of action shows it is based upon those laws 
or that Constitution.”23 It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to base subject 
matter jurisdiction on some anticipated defense based on federal law.24 
In Bennett, the defendants’ argument for removal was based upon an 
alternative theory:25 that the claims “arose under” federal law “because 
federal aviation standards play[ed] a major role in [the] claim[s] that 
Southwest (as operator of the flight), Boeing (as manufacturer of the 
airframe), or Chicago (as operator of the airport) acted negligently.”26  
Bennett employed the Grable two-prong test for federal question 
jurisdiction over hybrid claims. The plaintiffs called this the 
“substantial federal issue doctrine.”27 Using this test in Bennett, the 
Seventh Circuit first assessed whether the plaintiff’s claim, 
“necessarily raise[d] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and 
substantial.”28 In other words, the Bennett court reasoned that there 
must be a certain quality about the particular issue to warrant 
adjudication within the federal system. In this first prong, the Seventh 
Circuit used the Traditional Test espoused by the Supreme Court since 
the enactment of § 1331. While the Supreme Court’s test for this 
quality expanded over the subsequent years, the focal point remained 
the same. Professor William Cohen eloquently articulated this 
standard. He argued that federal question jurisdiction is only necessary 
in a specific situation: 
 
                                                 
22 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 See Bennett, 484 F.3d at 908. (The defendants abandoned one theory, which 
focused on complete preemption by federal aviation regulations, therefore 
preemption will not be discussed in this Note).  
26 Id. 
27 Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 16, at *5. 
28 Bennett, 484 F.3d at 909 (quoting the standard established by Grable & Sons 
Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)).  
5
Hadler: Outer Marker Beacon: The Seventh Circuit Confirms the Contours of
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 27
A novel claim of mixed federal and state law ought to 
qualify as “arising under” federal law only if it exhibits 
those features which justify the need for federal trial 
court jurisdiction of federal question cases. A case that 
requires expertise in the construction of the federal law 
involved in the case, and a sympathetic forum for the 
trial of factual issues related to the existence of a 
claimed federal right, ought to fall within federal 
jurisdiction.29  
 
Yet, based on the guidance from the Supreme Court in Merrell 
Dow and Grable, the Bennett court departed from this traditional 
inquiry. The second prong of the Seventh Circuit’s inquiry asked 
whether “a federal forum may entertain [the issue] without disturbing 
any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial 
responsibilities.”30 The Grable Court announced the “importance of 
having a federal forum for the issue, and the consistency of such a 
forum with Congress’s intended division of labor between state and 
federal courts.”31 By adding caseload factors to the decision to grant 
federal question jurisdiction in Merrell Dow and Grable, the Supreme 
Court ushered in the Modern Test for granting federal question 
jurisdiction in these cases.32 This factor proved dispositive in 
Bennett.33 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that a decision to uphold 
federal question jurisdiction would move an entire class of cases into 
federal court.34  
 
 
                                                 
29 William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise 
“Directly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 906 (1967).  
30 Bennett, 484 F.3d at 909. 
31 Grable, 545 U.S. at 319. 
32 See Tarleton, supra note 6, at 1408 (“Th[e] reconciliation of Grable and 
Merrell Dow is best viewed as a balancing test wherein the Court weighs the federal 
interest in providing a federal forum against the competing interest in avoiding 
excessive burdens on the federal docket.”).  
33 Bennett, 484 F.3d at 911. 
34 Id.  
6
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B. The Development of the Traditional Test  
 
Having established the difference between the traditional and the 
Modern Tests for federal question jurisdiction in hybrid cases, it is 
necessary to examine the development of these tests in order to assess 
their present day application. Article III of the Constitution of the 
United States, states that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of 
the United States, and Treaties.”35 However, the grant of the Article III 
power was not self-executing and it took Congress until 1801, in the 
famous Midnight Judges’ Act36, to grant federal courts the powers 
asserted under Article III.37 But the Act did not survive the Federalists’ 
departure from power and it was repealed by the Jeffersonian 
Congress within one year.38 Congress waited until 1875 to again grant 
original federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts, but 
this time it added removal jurisdiction whereby, upon motion, a case 
could be transferred from state court to federal court if there was an 
issue of federal law.39 While very little legislative history exists 
surrounding the 1875 Act, there is some suggestion that a distrusting 
post-Civil War Congress adopted § 1331 to protect federal rights from 
the individual states.40  
Although a federal question jurisdiction rule began emerging in 
the three decades following the 1875 Act, it was not until the Supreme 
Court decided American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,41 in 
1916 that the boundaries were truly clarified.42 The case centered on 
                                                 
35 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1. 
36 Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 
1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132. 
37 McFarland, supra note 5, at 3-4.  
38 Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason For It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why 
the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 601 (1987).  
39 Id.  
40 Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble With Statutory Federal Question 
Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1497 (1991).  
41 241 U.S. 257 (1916).  
42 McFarland, supra note 5, at 6.  
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the patent rights between two companies, both of whom manufactured 
similar pumps.43 The plaintiff sued for slander—a state court tort 
claim—because of the defendant’s threats to sue under the patent 
laws.44 In denying federal jurisdiction, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
stated that “[a] suit for damages caused by a threat to sue under the 
patent law is not itself a suit under the patent law.”45 Famously, Justice 
Holmes stated that “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause 
of action.”46  
Five years later, in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., the 
Court expanded federal question jurisdiction beyond American Well 
Works.47 In Smith, a shareholder of Kansas City Title and Trust 
Company sued to prevent the company from investing its funds in 
farm loan bonds issued by entities formed under the authority of the 
Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916.48 Seeking to enjoin the defendant, the 
shareholder claimed that the bonds were invalid because they were 
issued under an unconstitutional law.49 The Court took notice of 
jurisdiction sua sponte and provided the general rule that “where it 
appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff that the right to relief 
depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution or 
laws of the United States . . . the [d]istrict [c]ourt has jurisdiction 
under this provision.”50  
Although the case involved a Missouri shareholder, a Missouri 
corporation, and Missouri corporation law; the Supreme Court still 
allowed the plaintiff to bring the action in federal district court under 
federal question jurisdiction because of the presence of a federal act. 
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Holmes repeated his rule from American 
Well Works, stating, “[t]he mere adoption by a State law of a United 
States law as a criterion or test, when the law of the United States has 
                                                 
43 American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 258. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 259. 
46 Id. at 260.  
47 Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court, supra note 4, at 2273-74. 
48 255 U.S. 180, 195 (1921); see generally 12 U.S.C. § 641 repealed by Pub. L. 
No. 92-181, 85 Stat. 624 (1971). 
49 Id. at 201. 
50 Id. at 199. 
8
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no force proprio vigore,51 does not cause a case under State law to be 
also a case under the law of the United States.”52 Smith appears to 
lower the standard from American Well Works, making it possible for a 
case ostensibly under state law to receive federal question jurisdiction 
where the interpretation of federal law is at issue.53 This holding 
represented an important shift in the standard of analysis used to 
evaluate these hybrid claims, yet the “Supreme Court’s own 
subsequent elaboration of the statutory grant has left many 
unanswered questions.”54 
 The evolution of this particular subcategory of federal question 
jurisdiction continued in Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian,55 
where the Supreme Court appeared to tailor the expansion of the 
inquiry by the Smith Court.56 Gully centered on a dispute over 
outstanding taxes owed to Mississippi under an acquisition contract 
where all of the debts and liabilities of the old bank were to be paid by 
the new bank.57 The plaintiff sued in state court and the defendant 
removed the case to federal court on the “ground that the suit was one 
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States.”58 The 
plaintiff lost the case on the merits and appealed.59 The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the grant of federal jurisdiction because “the power to lay a 
tax upon the shares of national banks has its origin and measure in the 
provisions of a federal statute.”60 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed.61 The Court rejected the 
reasoning that the claim asserted by the state tax collector arose under 
                                                 
51 Proprio vigore, means “by its own strength.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1256 (8th ed. 2004). 
52 Smith, 255 U.S. at 215. 
53 See generally id. at 199-202; see also Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court, 
supra note 4, at 2272.  
54 Id. at 2274.  
55 299 U.S. 109 (1936). 
56 McFarland, supra note 5, at 11. 
57 Gully, 299 U.S. at 111.  
58 Id. at 112. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 114. 
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federal law because the fundamental authority to collect taxes derives 
from the sovereign powers of the United States.62 The Court stated that 
the “federal nature of the right to be established is decisive—not the 
source of authority to establish [the right].”63 Because countless claims 
could be found to have their origins in federal statutes, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that the federal question jurisdiction analysis required 
more than the mere presence of federal law; it required a “substantial” 
federal issue.64 In Gully, the Court, announced a distinction that would 
bedevil the federal courts over the next 75 years and appear at issue in 
Bennett: the distinction between federal controversies “that are basic 
and those that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary and 
those that are merely possible.”65  
The Supreme Court next addressed hybrid claims fifty years after 
Gully in Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Construction 
Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California.66 Similar to Gully, 
the parties in Franchise Tax Board were at odds over the collection of 
state taxes.67 The defendant was the administrator of an employee 
vacation fund for union construction workers in the southern 
California region.68 According to California law, the Franchise Tax 
Board was authorized to seek money directly from the vacation fund 
for unpaid state personal income taxes by contributor-members 
because the fund was an ERISA69 program.70 The Franchise Tax Board 
filed suit in state court and the defendant-administrator removed to the 
federal court.71 The Franchise Tax Board ultimately lost on appeal.72 
                                                 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 118; see also Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court, supra note 4, at 2272. 
66 463 U.S. 1 (1983).  
67 Id. at 3-4. 
68 Id. at 4.  
69 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2000). 
70 Franchise Tax Board  463 U.S. at 5-6.  
71 Id. at 7. 
72 Id. 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
jurisdiction was appropriate within the federal court system.73  
In contrast to the rule from American Well Works and more in line 
with the opinion in Gully, the Franchise Tax Board Court declined to 
grant federal question jurisdiction.74 The Court held that “the 
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a 
substantial question of federal law.”75 The Court reasoned that the 
“State’s right to enforce its tax levies is not of central concern to the 
federal statute” and that ERISA did not provide any direct cause of 
action for the plaintiff’s relief.  
As opposed to American Well Works’ clear rule that the “suit 
arises under the law that creates the cause of action,”76 Gully and 
Franchise Tax Board lowered the threshold and complicated the 
analysis by allowing for a jurisdictional determination to be made 
based on the presence of a “substantial” federal issue in a claim that 
originated under state law.77 The Franchise Tax Board Court reiterated 
the rule from Smith78 and rejected American Well Works, which it 
described as a useful description for the “vast majority of cases that 
come within the district courts’ original jurisdiction,” but not “an 
exclusionary principle.”79 
Thus, in the approximately 100 years since Congress first granted 
federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts, the Supreme 
Court has extended the reach of the federal courts and increased the 
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 28.  
76 American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 
(1916). 
77 McFarland, supra note 5, at 13-4.  
78 Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 9 (citing Smith v. Kansas City Title & 
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921)) (“We have often held that a case ‘arose under’ 
federal law where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on 
some construction of federal law.”). 
79 Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 9. 
11
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power of the national judiciary.80 Immediately following the 
enactment § 1331,81 a court granted federal question jurisdiction only 
when a federal “cause of action” created the claim.82 However, the 
combination of Smith, Gullly, and Franchise Tax Board established the 
Traditional Test.83 A court could grant federal question jurisdiction if a 
“substantial” federal issue was at stake even if the claim originated 
under state law.84 The prudence of the expansion notwithstanding, 85 
the Traditional Test was firmly rooted in this one tier inquiry, but this 
would not last for long.  
 
II. MERRELL DOW AND GRABLE ESTABLISH THE MODERN TEST FOR 
FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION  
 
This section discusses the transition from the Traditional Test for 
federal question jurisdiction to the Modern Test. Specifically, it 
focuses on the emerging importance of the judicial economy and 
caseload factors in the federal courts’ analysis of state claims that 
invoke federal issues.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 See generally Jason Pozner, The More Things Change, The More They Stay 
the Same: Grable & Sons v. Darue Engineering Does Not Resolve The Split Over 
Merrell Dow v. Thompson, 2 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 533, 543-48 (2006). 
81 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
82 American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 
(1916). 
83 See Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113-4 (1936) (“A suit to 
enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not 
necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does not 
so arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting 
the validity, construction, or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which 
the result depends.”). 
84 Id. 
85 See generally McFarland, supra note 5, for a detailed argument in favor of 
returning to the standard that a claim arises under the law that creates it.  
12
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A. Merrell Dow Introduces the Modern Test 
 
Following closely on the heels of Franchise Tax Board, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
Inc. v. Thompson and issued a decision in 1986.86 In Merrell Dow, the 
plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of the drug Bendectin, alleging that 
their children were born with deformities as a result of the mothers’ 
ingestion of the drug during pregnancy.87 The plaintiffs sought 
damages in Ohio state court on various negligence theories, among 
them that the drug was misbranded in violation of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).88 The defendants removed the 
action to federal district court.89 As in Bennett, the plaintiffs attempted 
to use a violation of a federal statute to satisfy one element of a state 
cause of action and the defendants argued for removal because the 
claim was one arising under laws of the United States.90  
In contrast to the traditional federal question jurisdiction 
decisions, in a 5-4 decision, the Merrell Dow Court held that the lack 
of a federal private right of action under the FDCA regime was 
dispositive.91 Here, the Court did not expressly overrule the 
“substantial interest test” from Franchise Tax Board and Gully,92 but 
instead returned to the logic in American Well Works, thereby denying 
the development of federal question jurisprudence over the previous 
100 years.93 According to the Merrell Dow Court, when “Congress has 
decided not to provide a particular federal remedy, we are not free to 
‘supplement’ that decision in a way that makes it ‘meaningless’.”94 
                                                 
86 478 U.S. 804 (1986). 
87 Id. at 805. 
88 Id; see also 21 U.S.C. §§321 et seq. (2000). 
89 Id. at 806. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 817. 
92 Id. at 813. 
93 Alleva, supra note 40, at 1525.  
94 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 812 n.10. 
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The result in Merrell Dow sparked criticism from legal scholars, and 
more troubling, confusion among the lower courts.95 
The decision left several different approaches to the analysis of 
federal question jurisdiction in state law claims in its wake.96 Despite 
the Court’s tough rhetoric in the decision regarding the need for 
“prudence and restraint in the judicial inquiry,” the Court actually 
expanded the lower federal courts’ discretion evidenced by “circuit 
opinions ranging across the spectrum of possibilities.”97 Some circuits 
required a private right of action to grant federal question jurisdiction; 
while other circuits merely required the presence of a “substantial” 
federal interest.98     
While the circuit split was an important result of the holding, the 
Court’s focus on the practical consequences of increased federal 
litigation99 distinguishes this case from the past and is the most 
relevant part of the decision to this Note. The introduction of an 
examination of the practical circumstances surrounding the litigation 
signaled a new era in federal question cases. Merrell Dow introduced 
the possibility that judicial economy could factor into the federal 
question jurisdiction analysis of state court claims,100 and marked the 
beginning of the Modern Test of federal question jurisdiction analysis 
of state court claims.101 The Court tried to explain its reasoning: “the 
phrase ‘arising under’ masks a welter of issues regarding the 
interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management 
                                                 
95 Compare Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (No right to 
bring case in federal court where plaintiff seeks use of federal law as element in state 
cause of action absent a congressionally approved private right of action) with Ormet 
Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799, 801-801(4th Cir. 1996) (Court concludes that 
action “arises under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because 
resolution of Ormet’s claim requires the determination of substantial federal 
issues.”); see also Pozner, supra note 80, at 555-71.  
96 McFarland, supra note 5, at 17. 
97 Pozner, supra note 80, at 555-556. 
98 Id.  
99 See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 811-12.  
100 Id. at 814 n.12.  
101 See generally Alleva, supra note 40, at 1557; Tarleton, supra note 6, at 
1410. 
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of the federal judicial system.”102 As opposed to the traditional inquiry 
into the nature of the issue in dispute, the word “management” 
suggests that a decision to grant federal question jurisdiction has an 
administrative quality—based on the amount of work among the state 
and federal courts.103  
Next the Court suggested that the rationale for the development of 
the “implied remedy doctrine” was because of “increased complexity 
of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation.”104 
Later in the opinion, hidden in a footnote, the Court recognized that 
not all cases to enforce rights originally based on laws of the United 
States could be heard in federal court.105 The footnote states, in part: 
 
A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the 
laws of the United States is not necessarily, or for that 
reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit 
does not so arise unless it really and substantially 
involves a dispute or controversy respecting the 
validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the 
determination of which the result depends. This is 
especially so of a suit involving rights to land acquired 
under a law of the United States. If it were not, every 
suit to establish title to land in the central and western 
States would so arise, as all titles in those States are 
traceable back to those laws.106 
 
In other words, a grant of federal question jurisdiction to any state law 
claim with federal origins would be impractical because so many state 
                                                 
102 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of the State of 
California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. California, 463 U.S. 1, 8 
(1983)). 
103 See generally Alleva, supra note 40, at 1557; Tarleton, supra note 6, at 
1410. 
104 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 811 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982)). 
105 Id. at 814 n.12.  
106 Id. (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1912)). 
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rights are traceable to federal origins.107 However, the dissent in 
Merrell Dow rejected these appeals to practicality stating: 
 
These reasons simply do not justify the Court’s holding. 
Given the relative expertise of the federal courts in 
interpreting federal law, the increased complexity of 
federal legislation argues rather strongly in favor of 
recognizing federal jurisdiction. And, while the 
increased volume of litigation may appropriately be 
considered in connection with reasoned arguments that 
justify limiting the reach of § 1331, I do not believe that 
the day has yet arrived when this Court may trim a 
statute solely because it thinks that Congress made it 
too broad.108 
 
There is a possibility that these practical considerations were 
pretext for federalism concerns.109 The focus of the Court appears to 
be on the federal judiciary, but perhaps this 1986 Supreme Court 
decision is an early example of the Court’s eventual push to limit the 
power of the national government in favor of increasing the rights of 
the states.110 The Court noted that the “increased volume of 
litigation”111 in the federal courts was a reason for the Merrell Dow 
holding, however, increased litigation in federal courts as a result of 
granting federal question jurisdiction to hybrid cases meant fewer 
cases were litigated in state court. It is possible that Merrell Dow was 
decided to prevent the states from being undermined and to protect 
their courts’ power.112  
The Merrell Dow decision resulted in two lingering issues: first, 
does the lack of a federal private right of action preclude a case from 
                                                 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 829 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
109 See Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory 
Limitations on ‘Arising Under’ Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309, 331-32 (2007).  
110 Id. 
111 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 811 (quoting Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377). 
112 See Freer, supra note 109, at 331-32. 
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reception in the federal courts; and second, how much weight does the 
impact of judicial economy have on a decision to grant federal 
question jurisdiction?113  
 
B. Grable Establishes the Modern Test  
 
The Supreme Court’s answers to these questions came by means 
of the unanimous decision in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc., v. 
Darue Engineering & Manufacturing.114 In Grable, the plaintiff’s 
property was sold to the defendant by the government to satisfy an 
outstanding tax liability.115 The plaintiff brought a quiet title action in 
state court.116 The plaintiff-corporation claimed that the sale of their 
property was invalid because it had not been properly notified of the 
sale by the IRS.117 The defendant removed the case to federal district 
court on the ground that resolution of the notification rules in the 
federal statute required federal question jurisdiction.118 First, Grable 
resolved the question of whether a private right of action was 
necessary to qualify for federal question jurisdiction.119 The Court held 
that a federal private right of action is only evidence of 
substantiality.120 After 100 years, the “substantial interest test” 
survived: the court granted federal jurisdiction where “state-law claims 
. . . implicate[d] significant federal issues.”121 
The Court did not want to give up all of the federal courts’ 
discretion to hear cases with federal issues embedded in state law 
claims.122 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that federal 
courts offer distinct characteristics that make them uniquely suited to 
                                                 
113 See generally Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808, 814-815. 
114 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
115 Id. at 310. 
116 Id. at 311. 
117 Id. at 310. 
118 Id. at 311.  
119 Id. at 318. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 312. 
122 Id. 
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hear certain hybrid cases.123 The Court reasoned that the doctrine 
approving federal question jurisdiction in state law claims “captures 
the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear 
claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial 
questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, 
solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on 
federal issues.”124  
The Supreme Court then added another factor to the federal 
question jurisdiction analysis.125 Grable held that even with a 
substantial federal issue in dispute, federal question jurisdiction 
ultimately rests on “congressional judgment about the sound division 
of labor between state and federal courts.”126 The Court described this 
new second prong of the analysis as a possible “veto” where federal 
question jurisdiction would otherwise be valid.127 Compared to 
Merrell Dow, the power of judicial economy moved “from footnote to 
text, and from hint to holding” in Grable.128 The Court continued, “the 
presence of a disputed federal issue and the ostensible importance of a 
federal forum are never necessarily dispositive.”129 In other words, the 
efficiency of the judicial economy may supersede the traditional basis 
for federal question jurisdiction.130  
The Grable Court officially announced the new two-prong test: 
(1) “does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, 
actually disputed and substantial, [(2)] which a federal forum may 
entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of 
federal and state judicial responsibilities.”131 Applying the rule to the 
facts in dispute, the Grable Court pointed out that the meaning of the 
notice requirement within the federal tax code was the only matter 
                                                 
123 Id. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 313-14. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 McFarland, supra note 5, at 31. 
129 Grable, 545 U.S. at 314. 
130 See McFarland, supra note 5, at 20; Tarleton, supra note 6, at 1408. 
131 Grable, 545 U.S. at 314. 
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contested in the case.132 First, the Court discussed the importance of 
the federal issue at stake, stating, “[t]he Government thus has a direct 
interest in the availability of a federal forum to vindicate its own 
administrative action.”133 Second, the Court concluded that the case 
deserved federal question jurisdiction because of the diminutive effect 
the result would have on the overall federal caseload.134 Thus, the 
Court held that federal question jurisdiction was appropriate.135 
The Court resolved the problematic circuit split136 from Merrell 
Dow and held that a federal cause of action is not a necessary 
condition for federal question jurisdiction.137 However, in doing so, 
the Supreme Court gave the lower federal courts discretion to deny 
federal question jurisdiction because of caseload factors.138 Writing for 
a unanimous court, Justice Souter focused on the risk posed by the 
multitude of cases that would surely emerge if every violation of 
federal law embedded in a state law tort claim was allowed to reach 
the federal judiciary.139 In other words, the Court desired a federal 
forum for substantial federal issues embedded in state law claims, but 
only to the extent that those issues would not overwhelm the federal 
courts’ dockets.140  
 
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE MODERN TEST BY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
IN BENNETT  
 
This section analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s application of the 
Modern Test for federal question jurisdiction in Bennett v. Southwest 
                                                 
132 Id. at 315. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 316. 
136 See generally Pozner, supra note 80, for an explanation of the circuit split.  
137 Grable, 545 U.S. at 316-17.  
138 Id. at 313-14. 
139 Id. at 319.  
140 Tarleton, supra note 6, at 1400 (“The difficulty with the two-part test stated 
in Grable arises from the fact that it separates the analysis of the significance of the 
federal issue in dispute from the analysis of congressional intent with respect to the 
scope of federal question jurisdiction.”). 
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Airlines Co. Specifically, it examines the reasoning the court used in 
its application of the second prong. 
Amid fierce winter weather conditions, driving snow, and strong 
tailwinds; Southwest Airlines Flight 1248 attempted to land at Midway 
Airport in Chicago on the evening of December 8, 2005.141 According 
to the NTSB, the plane—which held over 100 passengers—touched 
down about 800 feet past where it needed to in order to execute a safe 
landing.142 After touching down with only 4,500 feet of slippery 
concrete landing strip in front of it, the Boeing 737-700 ran out of 
runway and plowed through a jet-engine blast barrier and a perimeter 
fence, skidding to a halt in the busy intersection of 55th and Central 
Avenue during the evening rush hour.143 Joshua Woods—a six-year old 
Indiana boy who was with his family in one of the cars on the street—
was killed on impact, and ten other people were injured.144  
The consolidated complaints from the injured parties alleged 
various acts of negligence, including: the negligent operation of Flight 
1248 in violation of Federal Aviation regulations, the negligent 
operation of Midway Airport, including certain air traffic control 
functions, and the defective design and manufacture of the aircraft.145 
The ensuing tort suits filed in Illinois state court were removed to 
federal district court by the defendants (Southwest, Boeing, and the 
City of Chicago).146 The district court denied the plaintiffs’ request to 
remand the case to state court and granted an interlocutory appeal on 
the federal question jurisdiction issue.147 
The plaintiffs attempted to establish violations of federal aviation 
laws as the standard of care for the duty element in their tort suits.148 
The defendants argued that the “aviation safety issues implicated by 
                                                 
141 Fighting the Wind, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2005, at 3. 
142 Mark J. Konkol, Jet Needed 800 More Feet to Land: Thrust Reversers Were 
Deployed 18 Seconds Late, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at 6.  
143 Id. 
144 Fighting the Wind, supra note 141, at 3. 
145 Brief of Defendant-Appellee the Boeing Company, supra note 11, at *5-8. 
146 Bennett, v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 908 (7th Cir. 2007). 
147 Id.  
148 See Brief of Defendant-Appellee the Boeing Company, supra note 11, at 
*32. 
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plaintiffs’ allegations are inherently federal.”149 In support of this 
argument, the defendants cited both Supreme Court case law and the 
legislative history of the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”).150  
For example, as early as 1944, in a concurring opinion in 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota,151 Justice Jackson succinctly 
described the then-developing aviation regulatory scheme in the 
following way: 
 
Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not 
wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move 
only by federal permission, subject to federal 
inspection, in the hands of federally certified personnel 
and under an intricate system of federal commands. The 
moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an 
elaborate and detailed system of controls.152 
 
In creating the FAA in 1958, Congress explained the inherent federal 
nature of aviation rules in this manner: 
 
[A]viation is unique among transportation industries in 
its relation to the Federal Government – it is the only 
one whose operations are conducted almost wholly 
within the Federal jurisdiction, and are subject to little 
or no regulation by the States or local authorities. Thus, 
the Federal Government bears virtually complete 
responsibility for the promotion and supervision of this 
industry in the public interest.153 
 
The defendants also identified numerous federal rules that would 
require interpretation, which were implicated by the plaintiffs’ claims 
                                                 
149 Id. at *9. 
150 Id. at *9-10. 
151 322 U.S. 292 (1944). 
152 Id. at 303. 
153 See Brief of Defendant-Appellee the Boeing Company, supra note 11, at 
*26 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1811, 85TH CONG. (1958), at 5). 
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including: “acceptable landing procedures, airport operation, and 
runway design,”154 as well as snow removal and runway safety 
areas.155 
Despite the myriad of federal regulations undoubtedly at work 
that blustery evening, the Seventh Circuit held that the case did not 
“arise under” federal law for the purpose of establishing federal 
question jurisdiction.156 Chief Judge Easterbrook, in a short opinion, 
first emphasized that the Grable test controlled federal question 
jurisdiction in these hybrid claims.157 The test the court applied was 
whether the claim (1) “necessarily raise[ed] a stated federal issue, 
actually disputed and substantial [(2)] which a federal forum may 
entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of 
federal and state judicial responsibilities.” 158 Even though the Seventh 
Circuit initially expressed some disapproval of the Grable holding,159 
the court still applied its Modern Test.  
In applying the Modern Test, the Seventh Circuit first examined 
whether there was a “stated federal issue, actually disputed and 
substantial.”160 Here, the defendants argued that the suits belonged in 
federal court because of the presence of federal aviation regulations in 
the state court claims.161 They argued that the case required a federal 
forum because commercial air travel demanded uniform regulations.162 
The Seventh Circuit disagreed.163 The court pointed out that no federal 
issue was “actually disputed” in the case.164 Specifically, the court 
                                                 
154 Id. at *32. 
155 Id. at *33. 
156 Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 912 (7th Cir. 2007). 
157 Id. at 909. 
158 Id. (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 314). 
159 Id. at 909 (The Seventh Circuit states, “[B]y holding out the possibility 
(realized in Grable) that a contested federal issue in a state-law suit may allow 
jurisdiction under § 1331 the Court has greatly complicated the analysis.”). 
160 Id. at 909. 
161 Id.  
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 909-10. 
164Id. at 909. 
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stated that “[t]he meaning of federal statutes and regulations may play 
little or no role”165  
Next, the court reviewed the evolution of the interpretation of § 
1331.166 The court explored the holdings of cases beginning with 
American Well Works up to and including Grable with particular 
emphasis on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Empire Healthchoice 
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh.167 In Empire,168 the Court granted 
certiorari to settle a dispute between an insurance carrier and the estate 
of a beneficiary.169 The beneficiary received comprehensive health 
insurance as a result of federal employment.170 The beneficiary of the 
insurance died from injuries sustained in a car accident.171 Although 
the government insurance carrier paid for medical treatment, the estate 
also sued the negligent-driver and driver settled out of court; thus, the 
estate received two payments for the same accident.172 Upon 
conclusion of this civil action in state court against the driver who 
caused the accident, the insurance company sued the beneficiary’s 
estate in federal court because the company’s contracts with the 
government required it to try to collect reimbursement from the 
estate.173 When the estate filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff-insurance company argued that the 
federal court had jurisdiction based on the presence of federal law in 
the reimbursement claim.174 The Court denied subject matter 
jurisdiction on these grounds.175 
The Seventh Circuit distinguished Grable from Bennett in the 
same way that the Supreme Court distinguished Grable from Empire; 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that Bennett was a fact-bound inquiry 
                                                 
165 Id.  
166 Id. at 909-11. 
167 Id. at 909-11.  
168 Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121 (2006).  
169 Id. at 2127.  
170 Id.  
171 Id. 
172 Id.  
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 2130.  
175 Id. at 2137.  
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and not an inquiry into the meaning of federal law.176 It stated that this 
is “the sort of situation that is governed by context-sensitive doctrines 
such as the law of negligence.”177 In other words, the federal aviation 
regulations at work on December 8, 2005 were merely incidental to 
the state law claims within the framework of the action brought before 
the court.178  
The Seventh Circuit then applied the second prong of Grable’s 
Modern Test: whether “a federal forum may entertain [the suit] 
without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal 
and state judicial responsibilities.”179 This prong assessed the potential 
impact a grant of federal question jurisdiction would have on the 
federal caseload.180 The Seventh Circuit reasoned: 
 
The Supreme Court thought it significant in Grable that 
only a few quiet-title actions would present federal 
issues. That enabled the Court to conclude that its 
decision would not move a whole category of litigation 
to federal court or upset a balance struck by Congress. 
Things are otherwise with air-crash litigation: 
defendants' position, if accepted, would move a whole 
category of suits to federal court.181 
 
Whereas the Grable Court determined that only a few quiet-title 
cases would create federal issues, the Seventh Circuit believed air-
crash litigation could overwhelm the federal courts.182 Here the court’s 
reasoning is unclear; it does not specify whether the “category of 
suits” refers to air-crash litigation or some broader category of tort 
suit.183 Since the court completes the paragraph with a discussion of 
                                                 
176 Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2007). 
177 Id. at 912.  
178 Id. at 912. 
179 Id. at 909. 
180 Id. at 911. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
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Congress’s intent in enacting a federal statute dealing with large 
numbers of fatalities in air crashes, there is some implication that the 
court was solely focused on large numbers of air-crash cases seeping 
into federal court. 184  
Finally, the court concluded its opinion with a response to the 
defendants’ argument that federal question jurisdiction is suitable 
because commercial aviation requires a uniform application and 
interpretation of rules.185 Relative to the rest of the opinion, the court 
responded with a lengthy narrative on the particular hazards associated 
with the layout of the scene of the accident, Chicago’s Midway 
Airport.186 Again, because of the court’s specific focus on the airport-
airline aspect of the case, it fails to fully articulate its reasoning and 
provide future litigants with an understanding of its approach to the 
Modern Test.187 This is due in part to the problematic nature of the 
second prong.  
 
IV. THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE MODERN TEST  
 
This section discusses the problems with considering caseload 
factors in the adjudication of federal question jurisdiction. It also 
proposes an alternative analysis the Seventh Circuit could have used 
that would have reached the same result. Finally, the section gives an 
opinion on the meaning of Bennett to practitioners involved in 
litigation in the Seventh Circuit.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
184 Id. (“And it would upset a conscious legislative choice—not one made in § 
1331, perhaps, but surely the one made when 28 U.S.C. § 1369 was enacted in 2002. 
That statute permits suit in federal court when a single air crash (or other disaster) 
leads to at least 75 fatalities and minimal diversity is present”). 
185 Id. at 911-12. 
186 Id.  
187 See generally id. 
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A. The Caseload Factor 
 
The Bennett court applied the Modern Test established by the 
Supreme Court in Grable.188 The Seventh Circuit made a two-prong 
inquiry.189 In the first prong, the court analyzed whether there was a 
disputed and substantial stated federal issue.190 This prong is the 
natural extension of the traditional inquiry as developed by the 
Supreme Court in Gully and Franchise Tax Board, where the Supreme 
Court held that a substantial federal issue must be in dispute to grant 
federal question jurisdiction.191 In contrast, the addition of the second 
prong departed from past Supreme Court precedent and used caseload 
factors to assess the suit.192 The Supreme Court described this 
“possible veto” as follows: “the federal issue will ultimately qualify 
for a federal forum only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with 
congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between 
state and federal courts”193  
No doubt the increased federal caseload over the last 100 years is 
compelling. In 1904, the total number of filings in federal district court 
was 33,376 as compared to 89,112 in 1960.194 This increase represents 
a compound annual growth rate of 1.8 percent.195 However, in the 
period between 1960 and 1983, cases filed in district court tripled as 
“compared with a less than 30 percent increase in the preceding 
quarter-century.”196 This increase represents a compound annual 
                                                 
188 484 F.3d at 909. 
189 Id. 
190 Id.  
191 Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936); Franchise 
Tax Bd. of the State of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. 
California, 463 U.S. 1, 12 (1983). 
192 See generally Bennett, 484 F.3d at 911. 
193 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 
313 (2005).  
194  Hon. Richard A. Posner, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 
54 (Harvard University Press 1996) (1985). 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 59.  
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growth rate of 5.6 percent.197 During this same period, 1960 to 1983, 
pure civil case filings jumped from 48,886 to 210,503 in district court, 
a more than 330 percent increase, while court of appeals filings 
increased 789 percent.198  
More recently, federal appeals have increased substantially from 
29,580 in 1983 to 49,625 in 1995—a 4.3 percent compound annual 
growth rate, while district courts’ caseloads remained relatively 
unchanged in the same time frame.199 At the same time, from 1962 to 
1995 the “ratio of cases terminated without court action to those 
terminated with some court action has fallen steadily.”200 As Judge 
Posner writes, “[t]he implication is that the district courts’ workload is 
growing faster than the raw caseload.”201 
Despite evidence of the bloated federal docket, the second prong 
of the Grable test is not the correct remedy. The Bennett decision 
illustrates this contention. The second prong’s consideration of 
caseload factors in the federal question decision creates a paradox in 
the federal judiciary.202 Courts traditionally granted federal question 
jurisdiction to the most important or “substantive” cases or issues,203 
but now issues that impact the largest number of people—arguably the 
most important cases—will be denied jurisdiction because of the 
courts’ reluctance to move large classes of cases onto the federal 
docket.204 Thus, cases or issues that occur relatively infrequently 
                                                 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 64. 
200 Id. at 66. 
201 Id.  
202 See generally Redish, supra note 1, at 1785-88; Alleva, supra note 40, at 
1557; Tarleton, supra note 6, at 1410. 
203 While ‘important’ is a subjective term, it is well-documented that Congress 
created the inferior federal courts because certain cases required a heightened level 
of scrutiny. A specialized judiciary capable of a uniform application of the federal 
laws was necessary because a system that specializes in federal law is more likely to 
“divine Congress’ intent in enacting legislation.” Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. 
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826-27 (1986). 
204 See generally Redish, supra note 1, at 1785-88; Alleva, supra note 40, at 
1557; Tarleton, supra note 6, at 1410. 
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receive jurisdictional preference over cases that occur more often.205 
Instead the courts should grant federal question jurisdiction based on 
substance alone, without subjecting cases to scrutiny based on their 
impact on the federal docket. 
Administrative burdens should not be a factor in access to the 
federal courts.206 This premise is not new. In 1932, appeals court Judge 
John J. Parker of the Fourth Circuit argued that: 
 
One of the first duties of government, however, is to 
provide tribunals for administering justice to its 
citizens; and, if I am correct in thinking that a citizen is 
entitled to have his disputes adjudicated in a tribunal of 
the sovereignty to which he owes allegiance, it is 
unthinkable that that sovereignty should shirk its 
responsibility and abdicate its proper functions because 
of a comparatively insignificant matter of expense.207  
 
In his influential work on federal question jurisdiction, Professor Paul 
J. Mishkin maintained that “[t]he general approach favoring restricted 
access to the federal courts should not operate to justify the imposition 
of an unwieldy limitation unrelated to the purposes of federal question 
jurisdiction.”208 More recently, Professor Martin H. Redish declared 
that:  
 
The federal courts do not exist for the purpose of 
clearing their dockets. They exist to unify the federal 
system, to interpret and enforce federal law, and to 
prevent interstate prejudices and allegiances from 
balkanizing the nation. If the commitment of significant 
resources is required to accomplish this goal, then so be 
                                                 
205 Id. 
206 See Redish, supra note 1, at 1786. 
207 Hon. John J. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 
18 A.B.A. J. 433, 438 (1932).  
208 Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. 
L. REV. 157, 182 (1953).  
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it. Although considerations of docket control and 
financial limitations cannot be completely ignored, they 
should not receive primary emphasis. The federal 
government cannot shirk its responsibility to assure that 
the federal courts perform their designated role any 
more than it can ignore its other essential obligations. 
209 
 
Further evidence of the flaw of the second prong of the Modern 
Test is in the arbitrary result reached by the Seventh Circuit when it 
considered caseload factors.210 The court claims to be concerned with 
the risks of moving a whole class of cases into federal court, yet it has 
no guidance on the precise quantity of cases that would overwhelm the 
system.211 Clearly, a numerical test is out of the question and some 
level of discretion is necessary, but the lack of guidance is troubling; at 
what point does the administrative burden become too much?  
This dilemma seems particularly difficult for the Seventh Circuit 
because it cannot even decide whether the facts in Bennett are isolated 
or are likely to occur so often that the resulting litigation would be an 
administrative burden for the federal courts.212 For example, in 
Bennett the court expressed concern over the deluge of cases that 
would result from an affirmative grant of federal question jurisdiction 
in “air-crash” litigation.213 Four paragraphs later, however, the court 
admitted that the “particulars of flight 1248’s landing may never 
recur.”214 Here, the Seventh Circuit could just as easily have argued 
that the infrequency of airline crashes would not upset the balance of 
work between the state and federal courts. Then, the court would have 
only needed to prove that the construction, interpretation, or resolution 
of federal aviation statutes was the single point at issue in the case, 
thus satisfying the “substantial” prong of the Modern Test. 
                                                 
209 Redish, supra note 1, at 1786.  
210 Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 911, 912 (7th Cir. 2007). 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 911. 
214 Id. at 912. 
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Because of the arbitrary and potentially unjust consequences of 
the consideration of caseload factors in the adjudication of federal 
question jurisdiction, Grable’s second prong should be jettisoned in 
favor of a return to the reasoning applied in Gully and Franchise Tax 
Board. Still, a wholesale rejection of the 2005 Supreme Court decision 
by the Seventh Circuit was unlikely despite evidence that Seventh 
Circuit may have wanted ignore it.215 The Seventh Circuit admitted 
that it was burdened by a thorny Supreme Court decision.216 Referring 
to Grable, it stated that “by holding out the possibility . . . that a 
contested federal issue in a state-law suit may allow jurisdiction under 
§ 1331 the Court has greatly complicated the analysis.”217 While the 
Seventh Circuit may not have been able to ignore Grable, a slightly 
different application of the second prong could have still achieved the 
same result of remanding the case to state court. 
 
B. An Alternative Application of the Second Prong  
 
According to the Seventh Circuit in Bennett, the second prong of 
the Grable test is satisfied by not disturbing “any congressionally 
approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”218 
However, in the Grable decision the Supreme Court does not clarify 
where to find this “approval” from Congress.219 Given the vagueness 
of the second prong, it is unclear if the test calls for an inquiry into the 
balance between the state and federal courts announced in § 1331 or 
the balance imagined by Congress when it enacted the particular 
federal legislation at issue.220  
                                                 
215 Id. at 909. 
216 Id. 
217 Id.  
218 Id.  
219 Id; see generally Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg.,  
545 U.S. 308, 313-20 (2005). 
220 See Tarleton, supra note 6, at 1404-1405  
The second prong, requiring that an exercise of jurisdiction 
comports with Congress's intended ‘division of labor between state 
and federal courts,’ is styled as an examination of what Congress 
intended to be the general parameters of federal question 
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The Bennett court chose the latter reasoning.221 In analyzing the 
division of labor between the federal and state courts established by 
Congress, the Seventh Circuit chose to focus on the particular 
congressional intent surrounding aviation regulations, specifically a 
2002 federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1369, which “permits suit in federal 
court when a single air crash (or other disaster) leads to at least 75 
fatalities and minimal diversity is present.”222 The court determined 
that this statue would be “meaningless” if aviation accidents with 
under 75 fatalities were removed to federal court.223  
As opposed to the court’s fears of being swamped with litigation 
surrounding plane crashes, which arguably do not occur with the 
frequency the court asserts, a more likely explanation is that the court 
was afraid of the broader implications of granting federal question 
jurisdiction in Bennett.224 It may have been more concerned with an 
onslaught of tort cases in federal court because of a federal issue 
embedded in the claim. In their opening brief to the Seventh Circuit, 
the plaintiffs described the risk in the following manner: 
 
The result will be that every negligence per se case, 
where negligence is based upon a violation of a federal 
statute and/or regulation, will become removable; every 
case connected in any way to the airline industry will 
‘arise under’ federal law simply because federal 
                                                                                                                   
jurisdiction, which should be found in § 1331. Yet the Court 
accepts that this second half of the inquiry can proceed from an 
analysis of the substantive statute embedded in the plaintiff's 
claim. A more honest articulation of the federal question test 
would admit that Congress has, by no means, created a bright line 
demarcating the ‘sound division of labor between state and federal 
courts governing the application of § 1331’ and that jurisdictional 
decisions in particular cases must follow from the nature of the 
particular federal interest at stake. 
221Bennett, 484 F.3d at 911.  
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 See generally Elmira Teachers’ Ass’n v. Elmira City Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 
240552, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).  
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regulations may be relevant to establishing some 
element of a state-law cause of action.225 
 
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit, courts in other circuits have 
more precisely characterized the risks implicated by the second part of 
the Grable test. For example, in Elmira Teachers’ Association v. 
Elmira City School District,226 the defendants argued that an 
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code was necessary to reach a 
determination of a plaintiff’s state law claims.227 In remanding the 
case to state court, the Elmira court held that “[t]his lawsuit, simply 
put, is a state breach of contract and negligence case in which [the 
Internal Revenue Code], like the federal labeling statue at issue in 
Merrell Dow, merely provides the standard of care.”228 Furthermore, 
the court held that “allowing this state negligence and breach of 
contract case to remain before the Court would be tantamount to 
opening the floodgates for removal of similar litigation.”229 
Indeed other circuits also made the proper distinction between the 
risk of opening up the floodgates for litigation of the same type of 
claim230 (i.e. tort or breach of contract) unlike the Seventh Circuit that 
discussed the risk of overwhelming litigation from Bennett’s particular 
facts.231 In two separate cases in district courts in Missouri with 
similar facts surrounding train accidents, the judges refused to grant 
federal question jurisdiction despite the relevance of federal law in 
creating a duty under the state negligence law.232 Both cases rely on 
the same reasoning as it relates to the second part of the Grable test, 
stating that 
                                                 
225 Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 16, at *41. 
226 2006 WL 240552 (W.D.N.Y.). 
227 Id. at *3.  
228 Id. at *6.  
229 Id.  
230 See Peters v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1004-5 (W.D.Mo., 
2006) and Gillenwater v. Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 481 F. Supp. 2d 998, 
1004 (E.D.Mo., 2007). 
231 Bennett, 484 F.3d at 911. 
232 See Peters, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1004-5 and Gillenwater, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 
1004.  
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While bringing railroad crossing cases into the federal 
court system would have a small impact on the division 
of labor between the state and federal court system, the 
same argument that Defendants rely on to justify 
federal question jurisdiction here is applicable to 
virtually every case where violation of a federal 
regulation is raised as evidence to determine the 
appropriate standard of care in a state tort action. . . . To 
find federal question jurisdiction under these 
circumstances would open the floodgates to the garden 
variety torts that the United States Supreme Court, in 
Merrell Dow, specifically said should not be in federal 
court.233 
 
In other words, it is not necessarily the type of cases that the 
courts above have an issue with, but rather the route they took into 
federal court. This delineation makes the second prong somewhat 
more palatable. The Seventh Circuit would have been wise to note this 
distinction as the court did in Wisconsin v. Abbott Laboratories.234 
Here again, the defendants argued that the state court suit required 
some interpretation of federal law; in this case the court needed to 
interpret the meaning of the federal Medicare statute235 to determine if 
Wisconsin citizens had overpaid for prescription drugs.236 In applying 
the second prong of the Grable test, the court distinguished its case 
from Grable,  
 
By contrast, the present case is one of many that have 
been filed by states across the country concerning 
pharmaceutical companies' alleged fraud in price-
setting. Shifting all of these cases (not to mention other 
                                                 
233Gillenwater, 481 F. Supp. 2d 998 at 1005 (quoting  Peters, 455 F. Supp.2d 
998 at 1005.). 
234 390 F. Supp. 2d 815, 823 (W.D.Wis., 2005). 
235 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395qq (2000). 
236 Abbott, F. Supp. 2d at 820. 
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state-law claims grounded in alleged violations of 
federal law) into federal court would work a significant 
disruption in the division of labor between federal and 
state courts.237  
 
Here the court at least mentions the broader risk beyond the facts 
of the particular case.238 The Seventh Circuit could have utilized this 
reasoning and still remanded the case to state court. But rather than 
discuss the problems associated with bringing every tort case with an 
embedded federal issue into federal court, the Seventh Circuit went 
one step further to focus on the particular problems associated air-
crash litigation. 
 
C. The Meaning of Bennett to Practitioners 
 
The reference to another statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1369,239 in the 
Seventh Circuit’s attempt to discern the congressional intent in 
enacting airline regulations is an important indicator of the court’s 
narrow interpretation of the second prong of the Modern Test. 240 The 
Seventh Circuit reasoned that since Congress created legislation 
specifically authorizing certain air crash suits in federal court, it 
necessarily means that any other suits resulting from crashes, which do 
not qualify under the statute, cannot be filed in federal court.241 The 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Bennett seems more akin to the test 
established by Merrell Dow.242 In Merrell Dow, the Supreme Court 
used the lack of a private right of action in the FDCA to support its 
denial of federal question jurisdiction.243 However, the requirement of 
                                                 
237 Id. at 823. 
238 Id. 
239 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000). 
240 See Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir. 2007).  
241 Id. 
242 Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 (1986). 
243 Id. 
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express statutory authorization for federal question jurisdiction was 
specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Grable.244  
Given the other circuits’ application of the Modern Test, the 
Seventh Circuit may have been correct to deny federal question 
jurisdiction and remand the case to state court. However, the emphasis 
on the 2002 statute above shows litigants in the Seventh Circuit the 
great lengths the court will go to ensure a narrow reading of the 
Modern Test as set forth by the Supreme Court in Grable.245 Even 
though a relatively broad plain meaning interpretation of the “arising 
under” constitutional and statutory directive is possible, federal 
question jurisdiction in the Seventh Circuit will be very narrowly 
construed. Practitioners need to recognize that the clear presence of 
federal laws in the duty element of the plaintiff’s tort claim is not 
enough to clear the outer marker of federal question jurisdiction.246 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Bennett, the Seventh Circuit was asked to rule on the contours 
of federal question jurisdiction. In its analysis, it offered a recitation of 
the evolution of the boundaries of federal question jurisdiction where 
federal issues are embedded in state law claims.247 This history, 
especially in the Supreme Court, has been characterized by change. 
Much of the first 100 years of federal question jurisdiction governed 
by the statutory grant of § 1331 was more broadly defined than the 
recent interpretation represented by the Modern Test announced in 
Grable. The trend on the national level appears to be moving towards 
more restrictions on the types of cases that gain access to the federal 
courts. In particular, the recent introduction of caseload factors into the 
                                                 
244 See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 
312-313 (2005).  
245 See Bennett, 484 F.3d at 911. 
246 From the Bennett case, the factors included: acceptable landing procedures, 
airport operation, runway design, snow removal, and runway safety areas. Brief of 
Defendant-Appellee the Boeing Company, supra note 11, at *32. 
247 Bennett, 484 F.3d at 909-11. 
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jurisdictional calculus raises some question as to whether these 
restrictions may have gone too far. 
In its application of the Modern Test in Bennett, the Seventh 
Circuit followed this national trend. Despite the presence of multiple 
federal laws in the duty element of the tort claims, the court decided 
that since no single law resolved the dispute, the case was more suited 
to Illinois state court. The court’s analysis illustrates the great lengths 
the Seventh Circuit will go to eliminate cases from its docket. The 
result in this case will force practitioners to thoroughly assess their 
pleadings prior to petitioning the court for federal jurisdiction. But the 
larger impact of this narrow brand of federal jurisdiction remains to be 
seen. 
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